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Abstract: Stormwater runoff generally increases 
with the level of urbanization because the percentage of 
land with impervious surfaces increases. Traditional 
residential stormwater runoff control practices 
predominately use regulatory tools such as zoning 
ordinances and mandatory construction regulations to 
control runoff.  However, the introduction of voluntary 
incentive based policies can encourage developers to 
exceed the regulatory control standard when the 
economic incentive is sufficiently large to encourage 
voluntarily adoption of low impact Best Management 
Practices (BMPs).  A voluntary stormwater banking 
program (SBP) is presented that increases both developer 
profit and regional water quality relative to the existing 
regulatory policy.  Developers participating in the 
program receive a site density bonus that allows them to 
construct subdivisions at a higher residential density than 
allowed under current regulations.  The density bonus 
specifies the maximum number of additional lots that can 
be developed within a subdivision.  Participating 
developers agree to incorporate low impact BMPs into 
their stormwater management design and pay a 
participation fee to the SBP.  The SBP specifies the 
residential runoff level the developer must achieve to 
receive the density bonus. The value of the density bonus 
is influenced by the price of the additional lots sold and 
the additional low impact BMP cost.  When the net 
economic value of the density bonus lots is greater than 
the additional cost of adopting the required BMPs plus 
paying the participation fee, the profit maximizing 
developer will participate in the program.  In addition to 
potentially increasing developer profit, the proposed 
program benefits regional water quality in two ways.  
First, developers participating in the SBP provide 
stormwater runoff control above the minimum regulatory 
standard on new developments.  Second, the collected 
participation fee can subsequently be used to retrofit 
outdated and/or poorly functioning BMPs in existing 
developments to enhance/protect regional water quality.   
Introduction 
As urbanization density increases, less surface area 
becomes permeable to water and stormwater runoff from 
urban development increases.  The increased stormwater 
runoff transports greater amounts of pollutants and 
nutrient loadings into water supplies. Stormwater control 
is conventionally addressed using regulatory tools such 
as imposing residential density limits and open space 
requirements.  Incentive based policies that can achieve 
more stringent runoff control objectives and are 
supported by residential developers provide an 
opportunity to exceed the existing regulatory standard 
while increasing developer profits and regional water 
quality. Toward this end, a voluntary stormwater banking 
program (SBP) is developed that allows residential 
developers to build at greater densities in exchange for 
achieving an grater level of stormwater runoff control by 
incorporating low impact development (LID) stormwater 
Best Management Practices (BMPs) into their residential 
developments and paying a participation fee to the SBP.  
The participation fee is calculated as a share of the profits 
earned from lot sales resulting from building at the higher 
density. The proposed density bonus allows the 
developer to develop additional lots, or bonus lots, on the 
same amount of land.  If the developer chooses to exceed 
the specified minimum control standard to participate in 
the SBP by using additional LID BMPs, they receive a 
percentage-based rebate of the participation fee.   
   
Literature Review 
Randall and Taylor (2000) provide an overview of 
the merits of incentive based environmental policies. 
They emphasize that incentive based policies provide 
more flexibility than command and control policies, and 
have lower compliance costs. Parikh et al. (2005) provide 
a hydrologic, economic and legal framework for 
examining incentive and market based instruments to 
reduce stormwater runoff and illustrate how a voluntary 
offset program provides an incentive for landowners to 
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reduce runoff with low impact BMPs. Thurston et al. 
(2003) examine runoff control using tradable allowances 
based on impervious surface area. They show that the 
possibility of earning revenue from selling excess 
allowances provides property owners with an incentive to 
build low impact BMPs with greater detention capacity 
than the minimum regulatory requirement. 
Several cost effectiveness studies of stormwater 
BMPs have been conducted. Brown and Schueler (1997) 
provide cost estimates for the Mid-Atlantic States. 
Wossink and Hunt (2003) estimate BMP construction, 
maintenance and land costs in North Carolina. Hathaway 
and Hunt (2007) estimate BMP construction costs in 
North Carolina. Montalto et al. (2007) examined the cost 
effectiveness of  LID for reducing sewer overflow and 
found that only under high cost, poor design scenarios, is 
LID not cost-effective relative to common sewer 
overflow tanks.  Landphair (2001) reviewed the cost to 
performance ratios of several stormwater BMPs and 
found that infiltration basins tend to be the most cost 
effective BMPs in terms of cost per pound of total 
suspended solids (TSS) removed in watersheds larger 
than 10 acres.  Weiss et al. (2007) analyzed cost 
effectiveness in terms of suspended sediments and total 
phosphorous control for six stormwater BMPs used to 
treat urban runoff, and found that if land cost is ignored 
constructed wetlands are most cost-effective. However, 
in urban environments where land costs are high, less 
land intensive BMPs may be more cost effective. 
 
Stormwater Banking Program  
The fundamental idea behind the design of the SBP 
is to align the incentives of stormwater control authorities 
and developers so that stormwater runoff is reduced 
beyond the current regulatory standard to jointly increase 
developer profit and improve regional water quality. The 
proposed economic incentive is to allow residential 
builders to build at a higher density if they achieve a 
target control goal beyond the regulatory minimum.  
Greenville, South Carolina specifies area specific density 
limits for new developments. In exchange for relaxing 
the density limit and allowing more housing lots to be 
constructed on the same acreage, bonus lots, the 
developer must reduce stormwater runoff below the 
current regulatory standard by incorporating low impact 
BMPs into the development. The developer pays a 
participation fee to the SBP, calculated as a percentage of 
profit on bonus lot sales. The participation fee is 
subsequently used to retrofit outdated and/or poorly 
functioning BMPs in existing developments to 
enhance/protect regional water quality. 
The metric used to determine the level of stormwater 
runoff reduction is the Site Runoff Index Score (site 
score). The site score is a complex function of factors 
impacting runoff such as impervious cover, soil factors, 
infiltration factors, sediment factors and particulate 
runoff factors.  Each individual factor is scored on a scale 
from zero to ten and weighted based on its relative 
importance in determining the amount and severity of 
runoff. A site score of zero implies that all runoff 
eventually leaves the subdivision and adversely impacts 
regional water quality. A site score of 100 implies that 
almost all runoff and particulates are trapped within the 
subdivision and water quality impacts are minimal. 
For Greenville, South Carolina, a site score of 40 is 
consistent with the effectiveness of the current minimum 
regulatory standard. Alternative combinations of low 
impact BMPs were introduced into various subdivision 
stormwater management designs to estimate the effect of 
the BMPs on the site score using the IDEAL simulation 
model (Barfield et al, 2005). An iterative simulation 
procedure is used to determine both the appropriate 
combination of low impact and traditional BMPs, and the 
scale of the identified BMPs to meet a specific site score. 
Once the combination of BMPs and the associated scale 
level of implementation is determined to achieve a 
specific site score, the data is combined with a BMP cost 
data set to estimate the cost of increasing the site score 
from the regulatory baseline score of 40 to the targeted 
higher site score (Huber et al., 2010). 
Given the uncertainty regarding the type of single 
family residence likely to be built on any subdivision lot 
and/or the final selling price of the house, together with 
the reality that the developer needs to know the economic 
benefit of participating in the SBP before any houses are 
constructed, expected lot price instead of house price is 
used to estimate likely developer profit from participating 
in the SBP.  Developer participation profit before 
considering the additional low impact BMP costs and any 
participation fee rebate is specified in equation 1: 
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where, 
:  program profit before possible program rebate 
and additional BMP costs, 
LNB: number of original subdivision lots, 
LB:  number of bonus lots, 
PNB:  original lot price, 
PB:   new lot price at bonus density,  
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c:  fraction of density profits paid to the SBP as 
the participation fee, 0  c  1. 
  
The first term on the right-hand side of equation 1, 
measures developer profit from selling bonus lots. The 
second term reflects potential lost profit to the developer 
on the original lots if lot price decreases at the higher 
building density. When there is no price decrease, the 
bonus lots sell for the same price as the original lots and 
the second term in equation 1 equals zero.  The lost profit 
on the original non-bonus lots is not scaled by percent 
profit because the cost of constructing the original non-
bonus lots has not changed. Since the cost to construct 
the original lots did not change with the changing density 
the only thing that changes is revenue, that is the change 
in lot price times the number of original lots. After any 
lost profit on the original lots is subtracted from the profit 
on the bonus lot sales, this density profit is multiplied by 
the third term, one minus the fraction of density profit 
paid to the SBP (1-c). The overall value is developer 
profit before any possible rebate on the participation fee 
and the additional LID BMP costs are considered. 
Given space limitations, for simplicity, we assume 
that the percent profit on the bonus lots is equal to the 
percent profit on the original lots (% B = % NB).  
However, profit on the bonus lots is likely to be higher 
because the primary infrastructure costs (engineering and 
site design, permits and impact fees, clearing and 
grading, sewer and water infrastructure, and roads) to 
construct the subdivision have already been incurred. The 
largest cost incurred in constructing the additional 
subdivision lots, is connecting the lots to sewer and water 
services. Since the costs to construct the bonus lots are 
much lower, it is likely the percent profit on these lots to 
be higher than for the original lots.   
If the developer chooses to exceed the target site 
score, the minimum score needed to participate in the 
SBP, through more intensive low impact BMP use, the 
SBP provides a rebate on the original participation fee 
that assumed the developer only achieved the minimum 
target score.  The rebate provides the developer with an 
economic incentive to voluntarily incur additional LID 
BMP costs to exceed the target site score when it is 
profitable. The rebate is calculated using equation 2: 
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where, 
A:  rebate on the participation fee, 
TSC:  target site score for SBP participation, 
SC:  site score achieved by the developer, SC  
TSC,  
a:  percent rebate on participation fee for every 
point SC exceeds TSC.  
 
If the site score equals the target site score, then the 
rebate is zero.  Equation 3 is the sum of equations 1 and 2 
and estimates developer profit before considering the 
additional BMP costs ( *): 
 
(3)  A* . 
 
When the additional LID BMP costs (CBMP) are 
subtracted from * net program profit (Net *) is derived 





If Net * is positive, the developer has an economic 
incentive to participate in the SBP and will seek to 
maximize net program profit subject to the conditions 
imposed by the SBP.  A comprehensive Excel based 
spreadsheet program has been developed to provide the 
developer with an estimate of the economic benefit of 
program participation.  The working name of the 
developed program is the Decision Making Tool (DMT).  
The tool is based on the logic discussed above, but also 
provides the developer with additional benefits (site score 
points) for incorporating regional and neighborhood 
smart growth options into the location and design of a 
subdivision.  Because of space limitation the empirical 
illustration is restricted to on-site adoption of LID BMPs.   
Cost data from the Greenville, South Carolina area was 
collected to estimate construction and maintenance costs 
of the traditional stormwater management tools of dry 
ponds and wet ponds, as well as the following 
stormwater BMPs: bioretention cells, buffer strips, 
bioswales, infiltration trenches, porous pavement, rain 
barrels, green roofs, wetlands, and sand filters. A cost 
equation is developed for each BMP.  Revenue and cost 
data is incorporated into a spreadsheet model to 
determine whether the additional revenue from the lot 
density bonus is sufficiently large to offset the cost of 
adopting the enhanced BMPs plus paying the SBP 
participation fee. Engineering formulas are used to 
determine the mix of BMPs that most cost-effectively 
achieve the runoff standard.  
  
Empirical Illustration 
Ansley Crossing, a 39 acre residential development 
in Greenville, South Carolina, is used to illustrate the 
developer benefit of initially entering the SBP at the 
minimum target site score level, and then deciding to 
exceed the target site score.  Ansley Crossing has 11 
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buildable acres and under current density requirements, 
38 lots can be built on the 11 acres. The remaining 28 
acres consist of an unbuildable floodplain which serves 
as a natural filtration area. The natural filtration area is 
maintained in all illustrative comparisons. If the Ansley 
Crossing developer achieves the minimum target site 
score of 70, the developer can construct an additional 26 
bonus lots within the subdivision. A participating 
developer must pay 50% (c in equations 1and 2) of the 
density related profit from the sale of the additional 26 
bonus lots to the SBP as the participation fee.   
Table 1 summarizes the economic cost and benefits 
for optimal BMP combinations for four illustrative 
scenarios.  IDEAL in combination with the DMT was 
used to determine the lowest cost BMP combination to 
achieve a given site score in each Ansley Crossing 
scenario.  The top half of the table summarizes the cost 
of the onsite BMP practices needed to achieve alternative 
site scores for the four illustrative scenarios.  The 
baseline scenario uses traditional stormwater BMPs, 
consisting of a combination of 28 acres of natural 
filtration area and two dry ponds that total two-tenths of 
an acre, to achieve the minimum regulatory required site 
score of 40.  Scenario 2 achieves the target site score of 
70, the minimum score necessary to participate in the 
SBP for the original 38 lot subdivision but assumes no 
density bonus is available.  The higher site score is 
achieved by reducing the baseline dry pond area by half, 
and replacing the lost dry pond area with 18 100 square-
foot bioretention cells on 18 lots, and a 50 square-foot 
infiltration trench on the remaining 20 lots. This results 
in a total of 1,800 square feet of bioretention cells and 
1,000 square feet of infiltration trenches within the 
development.  Scenario 3 achieves the minimum target 
site score of 70 to participate in the SBP for the same 
subdivision, but at the bonus density development level 
of 64 lots.  With the addition of the 26 bonus lots, the 
BMP plan developed for Scenario 2, must be modified to 
achieve a site score of 70 at the higher building density.   
The higher site score is achieved by using three-fourths 
of the baseline dry pond area and adding a 90 square-foot 
bioretention cell on 32 lots and a 50 square-foot 
infiltration trench on the remaining 32 lots, for a total of 
2,880 square-feet of bioretention cells and 1,600 square-
feet of infiltration trenches within the development.   
Scenario 4 was developed to illustrate one set of changes 
in BMP selection and/or intensity that would motivate a 
developer to achieve a site score of 80, 10 points higher 
than the minimum site score required for SBP 
participation if the subdivision is built to the 64 lot 
density bonus maximum.  In this situation, three-quarters 
of the original baseline dry pond area is retained and a 
150 square-foot bioretention cell is incorporated into 32 
Table 1. BMP Cost, Effective Participation Fee 
and Profit by Scenario 
 Scenarios 
BMP 
Practice Baseline SC 2 SC 3 SC 4 
Bioretention 
Cell $0 $10,015 $15,469 $25,053 
Natural 
Filtration $0 $0 $0 $0 
Infiltration  
Trench $0 $4,629 $7,290 $10,837 
Buffer Strip $0 $0 $0 $0 
Bioswale $0 $0 $0 $0 
Dry Pond $10,060 $5,030 $7,545 $7,545 
Wet Pond $0 $0 $0 $0 
Wetland $0 $0 $0 $0 
Porous 
Pavement $0 $0 $0 $0 
Sand Filter $0 $0 $0 $0 
Green Roof $0 $0 $0 $0 
Rain Barrel $0 $0 $0 $0 
Total Cost $10,060 $19,674 $30,303 $43,436 
Site Score 40 70 70 80 
Additional 
BMP Cost NA $9,614 $20,243 $33,376 
Number of 
Lots 
38 38 64 64 
Lot Price $46,500 $46,500 $46,500 $46,500 
Participation 
Fee
--- NA $151,125 $151,125 
Rebate --- NA NA $30,225 
Effective 
Fee















Net Profit --- -$9,614 $130,882 $147,974 
Note: All cost, benefit and profit measures are calculated 
relative to the baseline scenario. Scenario 2 has a zero 
program profit before subtracting additional BMP cost to the 
achieve the target site score of 70 because there is no SBP in 
place to reward developers that implement management plans 
beyond the minimum regulatory requirements to achieve a 
site score of 40. In scenarios 3 and 4, Net Profit is calculated 
as the profit from the sale of additional lots, minus the 
participation fee and Additional BMP Costs incurred, plus 
any rebate the developer qualifies for.   The Effective 
Participation Fee is the Participation Fee less any Rebate. 
housing lots, and a 75 square-foot infiltration trench is 
included in the stormwater management plan for the 
remaining 32 lots.  In total, 4,800 square feet of 
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bioretention cells and 2,400 square feet of infiltration 
trenches are used in Scenario 4 to achieve the site score 
of 80.  Other BMP combinations which achieve a given 
site score were found, but are not reported due to space 
limitations. As the number of residential lots increases, 
impervious surface increases and the scale of BMPs 
necessary to achieve a given site score will increase. 
The bottom half of Table 1 summarizes developer 
profit in each scenario. No net profit is reported for the 
baseline scenario because under the baseline the 
developer is not in the SBP.  A total BMP cost of 
$10,060 is incurred to achieve the regulatory minimum 
site score of 40. Scenario 2 illustrates why the density 
bonus is necessary to encourage developers to voluntarily 
adopt LID BMPs. When the optimal combination of LID 
BMPs are used to attain the target site score of 70, total  
BMP cost is $19,674, $9,614 higher than in the baseline. 
Scenario 3 illustrates the economic benefit of 
participating in the SBP.  Based on a review of 700 lots 
sold in Greenville South Carolina between 2007 and 
2009, an average lot price of $46,500 is used in this 
illustration. Average profit per lot sold is assumed to be 
25% based on discussions with eight Greenville real 
estate developers.  Despite the higher BMP cost incurred 
to achieve the target site score of 70, the 26 lot density 
bonus increases net developer profit by $130,882 even 
though BMP cost is $20,243 higher than in the baseline 
and $10,629 higher than they are in scenario 2.  The 
increased BMP cost in scenario 3 relative to scenario 2 
results from the fact that additional BMPs must be 
installed at the higher building density to control runoff.  
In scenario 4 a site score of 80 is achieved. To achieve 
this higher site score additional LID BMPs must be used.  
To encourage a developer to design a stormwater 
management plan that achieves the higher site score a 
percentage rebate on the participation fee is used as the 
carrot.  In this illustration, for every point the 
development site score exceeds the minimum target site 
score of 70, the developer receives a 2% rebate on the 
participation fee. After receiving the rebate and paying 
the additional BMP cost, developer net program profit is 
$147,974.  Thus, with the rebate incentive, a profit 
maximizing developer would both voluntarily enter the 
SBP and design to the higher site score of 80 because the 
rebate exceeds the additional LID BMP cost incurred in 
increasing the site score from the minimum site score of 
70 required to participate in the SBP. 
 
Conclusion 
Incentive based policies hold promise to reduce 
stormwater runoff in urban areas and improve regional 
water quality by aligning the incentives of regulators and 
residential developers. The proposed incentive based 
SBP allows developers to build at a higher density in 
exchange for adopting low impact stormwater best 
management practices. An example development in 
Greenville, South Carolina was used to demonstrate how 
a policy of this type could both increase developer profit 
and reduce stormwater runoff beyond current regulatory 
standards.  Moreover, the collected participation fee can 
be used to retrofit substandard stormawater control 
measures elsewhere in the community to improve 
regional water quality.  
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